The European Commission’s Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA) is a proposal for the key instrument of the Clean Industrial Deal (CID). It aims at reconciling the restoration of  EU industrial capacity with decarbonisation through demand-side measures and the development of new markets. Market mechanisms such as the public procurement and support scheme provisions could unlock investment in low-carbon industrial production by guaranteeing demand for cleaner materials. Furthermore, industrial clustering and permitting reforms may reduce barriers to project deployment. The Act’s objective is therefore to enable emissions reductions without contributing to further deindustrialisation, a central challenge in EU climate policy.

However, the proposal is insufficient to ensure this outcome. The lack of regulatory precision, particularly the absence of binding and quantitative definitions of “low-carbon”, risks supporting incremental improvements rather than transformative change. Furthermore, procurement thresholds are too low to shift market behaviour and are likely to consolidate existing market patterns. Also, the removal of core instruments, such as the steel label, weakens investment signals and delays implementation further. Finally, the interaction between the IAA and the Environmental Omnibus introduces a new systemic risk. While their combined reliance on simplified and aggregated environmental assessments may reduce bottlenecks, it also creates a potential gap in environmental scrutiny, particularly in Industrial Acceleration Areas. Without proper safeguards, the framework may facilitate high-carbon or environmentally harmful investments.

This policy brief, developed under SLYCAN Trust's EU Work Programme, identifies critical gaps between the IAA's current design and what would be required to deliver genuine decarbonisation at scale. At present, the Act's market mechanisms offer promising structural levers, but their impact is constrained by a lack of regulatory precision, particularly the absence of binding, quantitative definitions of "low-carbon" production. Procurement thresholds remain too modest to meaningfully shift market behaviour, and the removal of instruments such as the steel label further weakens investment signals. Compounding these design weaknesses, the IAA's interaction with the Environmental Omnibus introduces a systemic risk: while their combined reliance on simplified environmental assessments may ease deployment bottlenecks, it simultaneously creates gaps in environmental scrutiny, especially within designated Industrial Acceleration Areas. Without robust safeguards, the framework risks facilitating high-carbon or environmentally harmful investments under the guise of industrial modernisation.